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[*1035]   
They worry for us. I worry for us. I worry that any minute someone - the police, a child welfare 
agency, a health inspector, someone - will burst in and arrest me, or maybe just shove me around, 
make fun of me, call me bad names, and then take Toph away, will bring him somewhere where the 
house is kept clean, where laundry is done properly and frequently, where the parental figure or 
figures can cook and do so regularly, where there is no running around the house poking each other 
with sticks from the backyard. n1 
In his quasi-fictional memoir, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, Dave Eggers explains how he became 
the single “parent” of his eight-year-old brother when he was twenty-one, following the deaths of their father and 
mother from cancer  [*1036]  within a month of each other. n2 Eggers never expected to be a parent under such 
circumstances. He never dreamed what it would demand of him or that he would be expected to meet those demands 
with only his older sister, a preoccupied law student, to help. n3 Eggers does not know how to parent or even what 
“good parenting” would be under the circumstances. n4 The surrounding culture provides little guidance and less 
support. 
If there ever was a coherent “family,” nested within an extended family, nested within a supporting community, it’s 
gone now and Eggers knows it. n5 It is this self-consciousness which makes him a postmodern parent; n6 he is all too 
aware that he is raising a child without the ideological, social or economic supports once believed essential to the task. 
n7 He is not alone, as June Carbone’s From Partners to Parents n8 and Nancy Dowd’s Redefining Fatherhood n9 amply 
demonstrate. As family forms proliferate, the meaning of “parenting” is in flux and an issue of  [*1037]  increasingly 
urgent concern. n10 Both authors respond to this with practical measures to make pomo parenting better for everyone, 
grounded, paradoxically, in the recognition that everyone’s needs are different and that ‘better’ is a contested term. 
Both authors are prominent family law scholars, radical in their visions, but well aware of the realities of family 
law practice and the politics of family law reform. Carbone describes a paradigm shift in the regulation of the family, 
from a focus on the partners’ relationship to a focus on their respective relationships with their children. As she puts it, 
custody has become “ground zero in the gender wars.” n11 After describing the “unfinished revolution” of changing 
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family norms, n12 she concludes with a nuanced description of the economic restructuring and cultural renegotiations 
that characterize the transformation of family currently underway. 
Dowd hones in on what Carbone calls the “fault line of gender” to describe emerging patterns of fatherhood. Dowd 
deconstructs fatherhood to expose its multiple dimensions and complexities. She makes a powerful case for 
reconceptualizing fatherhood in terms of nurturing rather than “genes and dollars”. n13 She then maps the obstacles to 
this redefinition, and exposes the law’s role in perpetuating them. 
My thesis is that both authors are part of a larger project of  [*1038]  postmodern family law, n14 in which 
commentators call for an expansive reconstruction of family law, n15 reflecting what Jean-Francois Lyotard calls “the 
postmodern condition.” n16 As Janet Wolff observes: “The radical task of postmodernism is to deconstruct apparent 
truths, to dismantle dominate ideas and cultural forms and to engage in the guerrilla tactics of undermining closed and 
hegemonic systems of thought.” n17 This Essay explains how both authors undermine hegemonic systems of thought, 
although in very different ways and with somewhat different objectives, through pomo analyses of pomo parenting. 
Part I describes their skepticism toward metanarratives, not only those of the traditional family, but the politically 
correct metanarratives of the egalitarian family n18 (Carbone) and the single-mother  [*1039]  family n19 (Dowd) as 
well. n20 Part II describes how both authors accept the fragmentation and flux of postmodernism. They recognize that 
we are embracing increasingly divergent norms, rather than moving toward some new consensus regarding parenting. 
n21 Part III explains how they grapple with the commodification of parenting, insisting that the economic value of 
nurturing work be acknowledged and compensated. Both authors urge a more child-centered agenda n22 and both 
realize that this is in tension with neoliberal as well as conservative priorities, even as it resonates with the rhetoric of 
both. Children, like the environment, are a long-term investment and no one wants to pay for them. Both authors aim to 
change this and, like Eggers, they undertake a daunting task with energy and style. 
Like Eggers, both authors show why pomo parenting is “heartbreaking work.” n23 Reading them in tandem gives 
added poignancy to the term, however, because Carbone’s desperate mother  [*1040]  may well be the victim of 
Dowd’s equally desperate father, and vice versa. The descriptive phrase “of staggering genius” becomes ironic here (as 
it is for Eggers) n24 because pomo parenting is more about daily drudgery n25 than “Eureka!” moments. 
Reading Redefining Fatherhood and From Partners to Parents in tandem suggests a more literal meaning of 
“staggering genius.” Jane Smiley defines “genius” as “a person who understands the few simple elements of any 
process that will propel it forward where always before it has been fatally retarded.” n26 Carbone’s genius lies in her 
ability to synthesize vast, disparate, and politically volatile materials into concise, lucid, non-inflammatory prose. 
Dowd’s genius, in contrast, lies in her capacity for relentless deconstruction, her ability to identify the ways in which 
ostensibly neutral institutions perpetrate subordination. n27 They repeatedly subvert each other’s arguments, 
accordingly, although they share many objectives. n28 Read in tandem, they become “staggering geniuses,” reeling 
from one knock-out punch  [*1041]  after another. n29 In the process, Dowd and Carbone demonstrate the range and 
vitality of pomo critique, and the need for such critiques to describe and address the dilemmas of pomo parenting. 
I 
Incredulity Toward Metanarratives 
As Jean-Francois Lyotard explains, postmodernism is simply “incredulity toward metanarrative.” n30 For Eggers, 
the metanarrative of the traditional family was as much a lie growing up as it is now. His father, a respected lawyer, was 
a secret drunk who spent his evenings watching television and sipping ‘quinine water’ generously diluted with gin, 
terrorizing his children with violent outbursts. n31 Eggers’s fiercely protective mother effectively abandoned her 
children, albeit unwillingly, through her long, incapacitating illness. n32 The Eggers children, not surprisingly, have 
become cynics. n33 
Like Eggers, Carbone and Dowd are incredulous toward the metanarrative of the traditional family. n34 Both 
realize that there is no big picture, only endlessly changing pictures on a small  [*1042]  screen. n35 There is no single, 
comprehensive norm of parenting; rather, there are multiple, proliferating, conflicting as well as overlapping norms. n36 
The “traditional” family has not dominated the social landscape for some time n37 - if indeed it ever  [*1043]  did- n38 
and neither author mourns its passing. 
They not only reject the metanarrative of the traditional family in particular, but the possibility of any new 
metanarrative in this context. n39 Carbone shows why by playing a wide range of analysts off against each other. Each 
‘grand theory’ incorporates a particular world view, reflecting a necessarily partial view of reality as well as a strategic 
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agenda. Economist Gary Becker, for example, explains that the wife in traditional marriage assumed unremunerated 
nurturing work, especially childcare, n40 in exchange for long-term economic security. This was undermined by no-
fault divorce, n41 however, which meant that men could leave the relationship before satisfying their part of the 
bargain. n42 
But Becker cannot explain why more women than men have taken advantage of no-fault laws to leave their 
marriages. n43 As Carbone observes, he does not appreciate “just how bad a deal  [*1044]  traditional marriage has 
been for women.” n44 Carbone draws on political theorist Susan Moller Okin to show that the demise of traditional 
marriage must be understood in a larger social and economic context, in which financial independence is for the first 
time a real option for most women. n45 
But if Okin is right, Carbone asks, why hasn’t marriage simply been renegotiated? Since women earn more, n46 
why don’t men nurture more? Okin’s metanarrative of the egalitarian family is belied by empirical data showing that 
women still spend substantially more time taking care of children. n47 The metanarrative of equal, rational partners 
negotiating domestic arrangements fails to capture a messier, more complicated, reality. n48 Carbone turns to economist 
Victor Fuchs, who proposes that women spend more time taking care of children because they care more about children. 
n49 
This is precisely the proposition that Dowd interrogates. Some fathers care a great deal, she insists, as shown by a 
small but growing cadre of fathers intensely involved in their children’s lives n50 and an emerging fathers’ rights 
movement. n51 At the same  [*1045]  time, she challenges the conventional wisdom that “more contact [with fathers] is 
important,” n52 noting that the empirical data to support this “are thin or nonexistent. Visitation or the lack of it does 
not make a difference to the child’s future; child support does.” n53 Dowd rejects the possibility of metanarratives by 
“questioning everything.” n54 She is always open to new possibilities, however, such as the yet-to-be discovered 
benefits of gay fathers’ parenting. n55 
Just as feminists deconstructed the ways in which women have been excluded from the work force, or their 
participation marginalized, n56 Dowd deconstructs the ways in which men have  [*1046]  been excluded or 
marginalized in connection with nurturing work. n57 As she shows, fathers’ parenting is rarely supported. n58 Rather, 
nurturing men are marginalized and discriminated against, and sometimes invisible. n59 The metanarrative of the 
traditional family constrains men, often at great personal cost, n60 just as it constrains women. 
In addition, by showing how men are victimized by workplace hostility to parents and welfare policies that exclude 
them, Dowd identifies an important new ally in the struggle for support of nurturing work in general. Such support is 
crucial to women’s workplace participation and children’s well-being. n61 Dowd is not  [*1047]  the only feminist to 
realize the importance of men to this project, nor the first. n62 Naomi Cahn and Joan Williams, among others, n63 
argue that the gendered division of labor cannot be altered simply by changing womens’ roles. n64 But few venture so 
bravely into the often hostile territory of fathers’ rights, n65 or so far into the dense thickets of social science. n66 
Carbone explores different territory with similarly rewarding results. Starting with Friedrich Engels, she crystalize 
the works of the leading historians of the family. n67 Their stories, she observes,  [*1048]  focus on the relatively 
privileged. In the United States, for example, the story of the family has historically excluded the stories of black 
families. n68 In a brilliant chapter summarizing the latest literature on family and race, n69 she shows how parenting 
has always been ‘raced’ and the costs to us all. Analyses grounded in the unspoken assumption that “parents” are in fact 
white and middle-class are not only irrelevant to many Americans, but lead to policies that are useless or worse. n70 
Dowd once again ratchets the discussion to another level. She draws on the full arsenal of identity politics n71 to 
show that “race” conflates diverse cultures n72 and that analyses have been classed n73  [*1049]  as well. The complex 
reality is obfuscated by metanarratives which inevitably erase certain stories. n74 
Both authors are interested in recovering those stories and showing how families can thrive in many different 
forms. n75 Carbone does so with lively anecdotes n76 and by drawing on television sitcoms. n77 The populations 
which are Dowd’s focus have not yet made prime time. n78 She takes a different approach, accordingly, relying on 
empirical studies by a veritable army of social scientists. n79 Trained as a social scientist, Dowd ably translates arcane 
data into accessible prose. Even as she supports her arguments, however, she criticizes much of the literature on 
minority families  [*1050]  as biased. n80 
The authors’ skepticism toward metanarratives precludes modernist plans for specific reforms, but it does not 
preclude clear visions of a better future n81 (although both are well aware that what is “better” for some may be worse 
for others). n82 Postmodern analysis, they show, need not lead to the “black hole of relativist postmodernism.” n83 But 
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their visions are “explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable,” n84 subject to ongoing critical assessment, based on 
ongoing experience and critical reflection informed by that experience. n85 Like Eggers, Dowd does not want “the 
police, a child welfare agency, a health inspector, someone” n86 taking children away from those who love and care for 
them. n87 While she wants more support for parents, including  [*1051]  private as well as state support, n88 she 
prefers to leave specifics open, relying more on pomo rhetoric than modern, legalistic formulas. n89 As she explains, 
Our ultimate progress will be measured ... in our ability to envision and implement a different 
construction of fatherhood for this generation. Our success will be measured not in the statistics and 
reports of the government, but in the common perception of preschoolers about daddies, who they are 
and what they do. n90 
Like Dowd, Carbone is talking about a revolution. But she does not want to replace one form of authority over parents 
with another. She wants the law to focus on providing more support for parents, economically as well as socially, but 
she doubts that the kind of revolution she envisions can be foisted upon parents, or anyone else. As she concludes, 
Society’s ability to influence family behavior is almost as much an issue as the content of family 
values... . Even with respect to issues about which there may be broad consensus - for example, that 
two parents are better than one - the ability to produce anything close to universal conduct is very 
much in doubt. n91 
Like Dowd, she seeks a change of heart, an expansion of our shared perceptions of “parenting.” n92 
 [*1052]   
II 
Things Fall Apart 
As geographer David Harvey observes: 
The most startling fact about postmodernism[ ] [is] its total acceptance of the ephemerality, 
fragmentation, discontinuity, and the chaotic ... . But postmodernism responds to [that] fact ... in a 
very particular way. It does not try to transcend it, counteract it, or even to define the “eternal and 
immutable” elements that might lie within it. Postmodernism, swims, even wallows, in the 
fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there is. n93 
After the deaths of his parents, Eggers cuts all ties with the Chicago suburb 
where he lived all his life and heads for a series of rentals in California. 
Even as he wallows in “chaotic currents of change”, however, he and his sister 
try to coordinate their hectic lives n94 and provide Toph with a wholesome, 
stable home. But it is a losing battle: 
We scrape through every day blindly, always getting stumped on something that we should know - 
how to plunge a toilet, how to boil corn, his Social Security number, the date of our father’s birthday - 
such that every day that he gets to school, that I get to work and back in time for dinner, each day that 
we cook and eat before nine and he goes to bed before eleven and doesn’t have blue malnourished-
looking rings around his eyes like he did for all those months last year - we never figured out why - 
feels like we’ve pulled off some fantastic trick - an escape from the jaws of death, the hiding of the 
Statue of Liberty. n95 
As Carbone and Dowd understand, pomo parenting is about ephemeral custody arrangements, n96 fragmented 
families, n97 and  [*1053]  discontinuous, even chaotic, schedules. Both “wallow” in “the fragmentary and the chaotic 
currents of change as if that is all there is,” n98 always insisting, however, that children be cared for even as chaos 
eddies around them. Indeed, it is in these very currents of change that each author finds her vision for a more child-
focused society. 
Dowd’s approach to fatherhood illustrates her acceptance of fragmentation and flux. Existing legal categories are 
inadequate, she argues: biological connection, marriage, or adoption may or may not be sufficient, n99 but none of them 
are necessary. n100 Rather than propose a new standard, however, she notes that “diversity is a critical value as we 
rethink fatherhood” n101 and identifies proliferating models of fatherhood from which to draw. She breaks these down 
into two basic models, a small but growing cohort of “significantly involved” fathers n102 and a much  [*1054]  larger 
group of uninvolved fathers. n103 In addition, she describes “serial parenting”; that is, men who act as fathers for the 
children of the women with whom they live. n104 
Noting that “the strongest of these patterns are social, connected to relationships and households,” n105 Dowd 
urges a redefinition of fatherhood as “social fatherhood,” n106 which she argues “best responds to the need for 
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flexibility, given the context of significant family fluidity and change.” n107 Dowd identifies five distinct categories of 
“social fathering” n108 and three overlapping subgroups - divorced, n109 gay, n110 and black fathers n111 - within 
each. She welcomes this complexity, arguing that “we should  [*1055]  work with existing patterns of fatherhood” 
rather than resisting them. n112 It is in these patterns that she finds her models: “Assumptions of deviance abound in 
much of the older literature on [divorced, black, and gay fathers]. More recent research tells rich stories of 
accomplishment and pluralistic approaches to fathering, suggesting positive models from these subgroups of fathers.” 
n113 Dowd concludes that “there are no easy answers, and keeping the answers multiple and flexible may be better than 
a simple unitary standard or definition. The data on which we act are provisional and tentative, which may argue for 
caution.” n114 
Carbone, similarly, welcomes proliferating family forms, deftly synthesizing the work of William Galston, Okin, 
Fineman, and Becker, “four theorists [who] recognize that contemporary families challenge conventional notions of 
family form, and reconceive the alternatives.” n115 The theorists refigure adult relationships, and show how children 
can be cared for within the modified adult frameworks. Carbone once again draws on a well-known figure from popular 
culture, n116 Murphy Brown, n117 to challenge their carefully constructed theories: “Murphy Brown destabilizes the 
categories ... suggesting that these efforts are futile, that the altered boundaries between home and market will  [*1056]  
produce too varied a set of adult relationships to provide for everyone, and that the norms governing adult relationships 
will not necessarily take children’s interests into account.” n118 
Carbone concludes with concrete suggestions for better assuring that children’s needs are met, given these 
destabilized categories and ever-proliferating alternatives. To address the insecurity of mothers confronting a “mindless 
emphasis on joint custody,” n119 as well as the disincentives for fathers in a “winner-take-all custody system,” n120 for 
example, she urges greater clarity for custody awards. n121 A standard that “starts with a presumption of both parents’ 
continuing involvement but also recognizes clear grounds for disqualification” n122 is better for everyone, she  [*1057]  
suggests. While Carbone wants more support from the state and the community, similarly, she again stresses the need 
for a nuanced, multipronged approach. She notes, for example, that the needs of families with small children are very 
different from the needs of families with teenagers. n123 While her proposals are concrete, accordingly, they are also 
flexible, reflecting and accommodating the fragmentation and flux of pomo parenting. 
III 
The Commodification of Parenting 
A. Too Much is Not Enough 
As Fredric Jameson has observed, “postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism.” n124 A key feature of 
this ‘cultural logic’ is commodification, or the transformation of something which is not commonly sold, traded or 
otherwise alienated - such as water or love - into something that is - bottled water or mail-order brides. n125 As Joan 
Williams, Adrienne Davis, and Martha Ertman recently noted in convening a conference on the subject, “Some fear that 
commodification assaults dignity and harms people, in part by crowding out other ways of thinking and talking. Others 
suspect that refusing to commodify amounts to one more way of keeping cash away from subordinated people.” n126 
Dowd  [*1058]  and Carbone show how the commodification of parenting has in fact “crowded out other ways of 
thinking.” n127 At the same time, the refusal to commodify parenting “amounts to one more way of keeping cash away 
from subordinated people.” n128 There is, in short, both too much commodification and not enough. 
Children may be “priceless,” n129 but they are also quite expensive. Dowd and Carbone show how this is ignored 
in both family law and welfare law, and the resultant costs to society at large. The costs of parenting not only include 
dollars spent for groceries and fast food, pediatricians and orthodontists, school lunches and fees, but time spent 
dressing, feeding, cleaning up after and driving children to their schools, appointments, and soccer games. n130 These 
costs are difficult to calculate within the black box of the intact marriage, n131 although the dollars are generally linked 
to male breadwinners and time to female breadmakers. n132 Where there is no intact family, either because of divorce 
or because the  [*1059]  parents never married, n133 these costs are rarely met. The loss to society at large, in terms of 
neglected, abused, underachieving, or delinquent children, n134 and stressed, overworked, debt-burdened parents, is 
clearly enormous, n135 although probably incalculable. n136 
B. Child Support 
While everyone agrees that parents should support their children, the amount and source n137 of such support has 
been subject to wide-ranging debate. n138 After years of studies, discussions and debate, n139 Congress required the 
states to promulgate child support  [*1060]  guidelines n140 in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
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Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). n141 As both authors note, the resultant guidelines severely underestimate the 
actual costs of raising children, to the detriment of children and their custodial parents. n142 The persistence of low 
child support guidelines is overdetermined; that is, it is attributable to redundant factors and is thus likely to persist even 
if some of these factor are addressed. Non-custodial parents, for example, are generally unwilling to indirectly subsidize 
the custodial parent through generous child support payments. n143 In addition, as Dowd points out, child support was 
never intended to secure adequate support. n144 Rather, it was designed only as a partial contribution. n145 Even if 
these factors were addressed, however, child support guidelines would probably remain low because nurturing work is 
undervalued. This is grounded, in part, in the expectation that parents will nurture for “love,” rather than for money, as 
mothers usually have. n146 
[*1061]  Notwithstanding low guidelines, which impose a relatively minor burden on most non-custodial parents, 
collection rates remain low, especially in non-marital cases. As Carbone explains: 
Many ... mothers never seek support in the first place. Their reasons are varied. They include the 
father’s poverty, his disappearance, fear of his reaction, and the desire to exclude him from a further 
role in the child’s life. They may also include a mother’s sense that it is unfair to seek support from 
the father if he had no role in the decision to forgo contraception, or the one not to seek an abortion. 
n147 
Many fathers have a similar perspective. According to Dowd, “fathers back away from the breadwinner role after 
divorce or if they never marry... . Fathers see any decline in payment of child support as justified by the decline in 
contact with their children.” n148 In short, even if child support is paid, it is usually inadequate. n149 Fathers are 
reluctant to pay even low child support, and sometimes mothers are reluctant to seek it, because fathers aren’t getting 
what they pay for and mothers don’t want them to. Society (that is, the rest of us) views this as a private matter, as long 
as the mother and children do not qualify for welfare. n150 
C. Welfare 
The gap between children’s needs and the resources to meet those needs is even sharper in the context of welfare, 
n151 where  [*1062]  virtually all recipients are women. n152 As Carbone vividly shows in her contrasting stories of 
unwed mothers, one black and one white, the black woman “receives [support] from the African-American community 
... strengthened by the hostility they know [she] will receive from whites and the conviction that adoption is not a viable 
option for black babies.” n153 The point of welfare is not to support such mothers, but to perpetuate values about family 
structure that are irrelevant to them. n154 
Dowd is even more emphatic, arguing that we fail to make welfare benefits sufficient to support children because 
we are afraid that doing so will encourage irresponsible reproduction. n155 She rejects this as part of a profoundly 
gendered ideology, which persists in casting men as breadwinners and women as nurturers. She argues that the scope of 
these gendered constructs can only be appreciated by looking at the broader, worker-oriented structure of tax and social 
security benefits. These laws combine with welfare laws and child support laws to perpetuate the same gendered 
division of labor described by Becker and criticized by Okin. n156 This division of labor is a major obstacle to Dowd’s 
“social fathers” and she proposes specific measures to counter it, including “universal, non-needs-based subsidies, tax 
benefits to individuals and businesses, paying salaries and benefits to nurturers,  [*1063]  or supporting credits ... for 
nurturing work, akin to the valuing of military service through the range of veterans benefits and preferences.” n157 For 
Dowd, nurturing work is as critical to our collective well-being as defense. n158 
Conclusion 
Children are a long-term, collective investment. n159 These books contribute significantly to the rhetoric necessary 
to make this investment a political priority. Whether such rhetoric will suffice, of course, is an open question. As 
Carbone points out, pro-family rhetoric has historically imposed most of the costs on women. n160 While she seems 
reluctant to perpetuate this imposition, conservative support may well be crucial in implementing a pro-child agenda. At 
the same time, the pro-family movement risks paralysis if it tries to be all things to all factions. Dowd, similarly, makes 
a convincing argument that men would benefit from the kind of social supports that Western Europe has long taken for 
granted. n161 Her vision of a strong social safety net has always been a hard sell in America, however. n162 It’s no 
easier  [*1064]  now, as Western Europe retreats from expensive social welfare programs and the United States 
congratulates itself on the “end of welfare as we know it.” n163 
At the same time, as both authors demonstrate, they are hardly fighting against an irresistible tide. Rather, they are 
riding currents which already support some of their proposals. The parents whose stories fill these books, such as 
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Dowd’s “serial fathers” and those at “ground zero in the gender wars” n164 in Carbone’s account, suggest major, still 
untapped support for the child-centered visions of these authors. n165 Reading these books in tandem provides a sense 
of the dynamic of change, the synergy between Dowd’s relentless deconstruction and Carbone’s equally indomitable 
synthesis, through which such visions may be realized. 
In A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, n166 the brothers achieve a similar synergy when they play 
frisbee. n167 They become, however briefly, ordinary American boys on a beach, an everyday miracle: 
There is nowhere I stop and you begin ... when Toph catches his, he flexes with a fury, his muscles 
just these taut strings, his mouth open, teeth straight and pushing so hard against each other. And 
when I catch I do it, too, I flex and yell and vibrate - Can you see this? Goddamn, look at that fucking  
[*1065]  throw did you see Toph throw that goddamn thing, the trajectory on that fucking thing? It’s 
going way past me but I can run under it, I am barefoot and run like an Indian and I can look back and 
it’s still coming, I can see Toph in the distance, blond and perfect ... and I am there as [the frisbee] 
drifts down and into my hands, my hands spread out, thumbs as wings, because I am there, ready to 
cradle it as it spins just for a second until it stops. I am there. I was there. Don’t you know that I am 
connected to you? n168 
Dowd and Carbone do know that they are connected to struggling pomo parents like Eggers, as well as to the child 
he is trying to raise. n169 Both would respect the brothers’ privacy, the intimate space of the family that they inhabit 
even on a public beach. But both would willingly join in the game (if Eggers let them), because they also know that the 




n1. Dave Eggers, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius 82 (2001).  
n2. Eggers cites The Importance of Being Earnest: “To have lost one parent, Mr. Worthing, might be considered a 
misfortune. To have lost both smacks of carelessness.” Eggers, supra note 1, at “A) The Unspoken Magic of Parental 
Disappearance.”  
n3. Cf. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law 239 (2000) (“For many of 
my generation who thought we knew what to expect from relationships, parenthood - with its demands, external 
expectations, gender divisions, and emotional intensity - took us by surprise.”).  
n4. See infra note 168 (citing Dowd on men’s frequent need for parent education).  
n5. See Stephenie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (1992). While 
diversity may not be new, it has not always been recognized. What is “new” is our self-consciousness. See, e.g., Nathan 
Glazer, We Are All Multiculturalists Now 13-14 (1997).  
n6. As explained below, this self-consciousness has multiple manifestations, including skepticism toward the 
metanarrative of the family, see infra text accompanying notes 30-32, acceptance of fragmentation and flux, see infra 
text accompanying notes 93-95, and recognition of the commodification of parenting, see infra note 130.  
n7. Indeed, one of Eggers’s major themes is that schools, employers, and landlords are as unprepared to deal with 
his parenting role as he is. The larger social, economic and legal structures in which they all function, moreover, are 
obviously arranged for someone else. Cf. Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern 
Marriage Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1479, 1482 (2001) [hereinafter Stark, Postmodern Marriage Law] (explaining how 
many, paradoxically, feel like members of a slighted minority, excluded by norms which benefit others.). Thus, for 
example, married women who stay home with young children complain about their characterization as ‘soccer moms’ 
even as commentators ask why the work of black single mothers is not considered work at all. See id.; see also Nancy E. 
Dowd, Redefining Fatherhood 135 (2000) (concluding that “those affected most by the family law structure experience 
it as strongly gender-biased [against them]”).  
n8. Carbone, supra note 3.  
n9. Dowd, supra note 7.  
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n10. To “father” a child usually refers to a one-time procreative event, while to “mother” a child usually refers to a 
more labor-intensive nurturing relationship. See Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 Yale J.L. & Feminism 177, 
183 (2000) (“When we think of ideal parenting, we typically envision ‘mothering,’ rather than ‘fathering.’“). Some 
feminists question the term “parenting.” “[Martha Fineman] reserves greatest disdain for liberal feminists, who would, 
in the name of the egalitarian family, equate mothering with fathering, and substitute the term ‘parenting’ for both 
activities. Fineman describes this conflation as the ‘neutering’ of the mother, erasing her ... from view.” Carbone, supra 
note 3, at 23. Both authors recognize that for a variety of social, cultural, economic and political reasons, women and 
men usually parent very differently. Dowd, supra note 7, at 229; Carbone, supra note 3, at 116 (“That gender differences 
exist, and that men and women ‘parent’ somewhat differently is not in dispute. That these differences make the presence 
of a mother and a father ... indispensable to children’s well-being is another matter.”). For a description of the ways in 
which these differences become internalized, and how such internalized psychological constructs in turn shape external 
social, political and cultural factors, see Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Begin 
Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1483 (1991).  
n11. Carbone, supra note 3, at 180.  
n12. Id. at 227.  
n13. Dowd, supra note 7, at 157-80.  
n14. This is not an exclusive affiliation; both may be part of other projects as well. Brian Bix notes Carbone’s 
significant contribution to law and economics, for example. See, e.g., Brian Bix, How to Plot Love on an Indifference 
Curve, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1439, 1452 (2001) (book review). At the same time, however, Bix notes the multiple methods 
employed by Carbone, id. at 1447-54, and her resistance to closure, see infra note 91, which contribute to what I view as 
the postmodern character of her analysis.  
n15. I have explained how this plays out in the context of marriage law. Stark, Postmodern Marriage Law, supra 
note 7; see generally Judith Stacey, In The Name of The Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern Age 
(1996); Nancy E. Dowd, In Defense of Single-Parent Families (1997); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 
98 Yale L.J. 293 (1988); Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 225, 234 (1997) 
(book review summarizing Dowd’s first book, In Defense of Single-Parent Families (1997)). For a thoughtful analysis 
of “postmodern personal life”, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy 68-88 (1993). Regan’s 
description of “fractional relationships,” built around a “limited aspect of one’s being,” resonates powerfully in the 
instant context. Id. at 86 (citation omitted). Indeed, his first example is a parent spending “quality time” with a child. Id. 
For an explanation of Edward Shorter’s use of the term “postmodern family” in 1975, see Stacey, supra, at 7. See 
generally Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington 
eds., 1994).  
n16. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Geoff Bennington & Brian 
Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984). Carbone’s thesis, that “if family obligation ... is to be rebuilt at all in a way 
that links individual obligation to societal needs - then parenthood may be the only remaining candidate,” Carbone, 
supra note 3, at 129, is predicated on her description of the “post-modern family type” she describes in id. at 127. See 
Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 70 n.275 (2001) (citing Dowd’s 
work on single-parent families as conducive to the “agenda” of postmodern feminists).  
n17. Janet Wolff, Postmodern Theory and Feminist Art Practice, in Post-modernism and Society 187, 190 (Roy 
Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990).  
n18. Carbone draws on Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) to depict the egalitarian family. 
Carbone, supra note 3, at 16-19. Carbone, like Dowd, has nothing against the egalitarian family but insists on making its 
assumptions explicit. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 3, at 28-29 (noting that Okin’s egalitarian family assumes two-
income households and a negligible role for the state).  
n19. Martha Fineman has called this the “mother-child dyad.” Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 
The Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 230 (1995). This is not to suggest that Dowd disparages the 
single-mother family, which was the focus of her first book, In Defense of Single-Parent Families. See supra note 15. 
Rather, she rejects it as the sole alternative to the nuclear family.  
n20. Pomo parenting, like postmodernism in general, encourages strange bedfellows. See Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alternative 7 (1999) (explaining how 
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“individuals and groups from all parts of the political spectrum have come together ... questioning the supremacy of 
family preservation policies”); Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 49 (1997) (cover story) 
(“By joining forces with second wives, grandparents and noncustodial mothers, and toning down some of its rhetorical 
excess, a large chunk of the [fathers’ rights] movement has become more mainstream.”).  
n21. While Carbone suggests that parenting is the new paradigm, Carbone, supra note 3, passim, her definition of 
“parenting” is broad, inclusive, and flexible. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 115-23.  
n22. Naomi Cahn calls this the “new morality:” 
The new morality also sees responsibility for children as a more general societal commitment in 
which caretaking is appropriately valued and gender equality is assured. In this context of 
commitment to children, responsible parenthood does not only depend on the presence of a second 
parent, but also on greater public support, reformed workplaces that accommodate men’s and 
women’s caretaking needs, and better support for child care. 
Cahn, supra note 15, at 240.  
n23. As a single father of two teenagers confesses, “Behind that display of decisive competence that you show the 
world, sometimes there’s a lonely man who’s hurting. Behind that confident exterior, sometimes there is someone 
who’s sailing alone in uncharted waters without a map or a compass.” Carey Goldberg, Single Dads Wage Revolution 
One Bedtime Story at a Time, N.Y. Times, June 17, 2001, at 1, 14.  
n24. “Which is to say nothing of the faux (real? No, you beg, please no) boastfulness of the whole title put 
together.” Eggers, supra note 1, at “pretend it’s fiction.” There is a further irony here, of course, in the notion of a 
young, single parent as somehow extraordinary. In fact, there are millions of such parents, most of whom are female and 
black or hispanic. Whether Eggers’s tragedy would distinguish him in this group is an open question.  
n25. Anna Quindlen, Playing God on No Sleep, Newsweek, July 2, 2001, at 64 (concluding a compassionate 
commentary on Andrea Yates, “who apparently spent a recent morning drowning her five children in the bathtub” and 
noting that “just because you love people doesn’t mean that taking care of them day in and day out isn’t often hard, and 
sometimes even horrible”).  
n26. Jane Smiley, Horse Heaven 383 (2000).  
n27. This theme has been explored in a burgeoning literature focusing on race and gender. Some prominent 
examples include: Stephanie Wildman, Privilege Revealed: How Invisible Preference Undermines America (1996); Ian 
F. Haney Lopez, White By Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996); and Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I 
See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1993). Dowd’s 
contribution is to show how this analysis applies to men in the context of parenting, without ignoring their still-
privileged status in other contexts. See, e.g., Harlon Dalton, The Clouded Prism: Minority Critique of the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, in Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement 80, 83 n.10 (Kimberle 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (describing his reaction to white males who said they had felt silenced by his remarks). “I 
was instantly reminded of my own response, at age seven or so, to a playmate whose mother had recently died. ‘I know 
how you feel,’ I said knowingly. ‘We just buried my favorite turtle after it softened to death.’“ Id.  
n28. See, e.g., infra note 53 (noting benefits of “enhanced paternal involvement” while Dowd breaks such 
involvement down into “contact” and “support”).  
n29. The image is from Girlfight (Screen Gems 2001), in which a feisty young woman breaks down another gender 
barrier. See Rita Kempley, Girlfight: Think Rocky with a Feminist Hook, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2000, at CO1 (“Boxing 
has always been a great social leveler for minorities - the Irish, blacks, Hispanics - so why not women?”). The allusion 
is apt here because both authors are fighters, champions for those children and parents neglected by the law, although 
not always on the same side. In addition, as another reviewer noted about the star, “she doesn’t so much transcend 
gender as redefine it.” A.O. Scott, Floating Like a Butterfly, Stinging Like a Bee, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2000, at E22. 
Both authors similarly redefine gender.  
n30. Lyotard, supra note 16, at xxiv. This “incredulity” resonates with feminist critiques of “grand theory.” See, 
e.g., Carbone, supra note 3, at 4 (describing Gary Becker’s “attempt to explain the family in terms of ‘grand [economic] 
theory’“); see also Martha L.A. Fineman, Feminist Legal Scholarship and Women’s Gendered Lives, in Lawyers in a 
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Postmodern World, supra note 15, at 229, 233 (urging feminists to “challenge and compete with the existing totalizing 
nature of grand legal theory”).  
n31. See, e.g., Eggers, supra note 1, at 232-33 (describing a night when his father broke down his bedroom door).  
n32. See, e.g., Eggers, supra note 1, at 1-45.  
n33. “At Christmas, as with all holidays we still bother with, we celebrate it in a way that’s at once an homage to 
our parents and their way of going about things, but more often a vicious sort of parody.” Eggers, supra note 1, at 302.  
n34. As Carbone notes, “The dismantling of marriage as the exclusive determinant of family connections, is 
complete and well documented in every discipline that has undertaken the task.” Carbone, supra note 3, at 227. Carbone 
earlier cites Mary Ann Glendon for the proposition that “the traditionally central position of legal marriage in family has 
been extensively eroded everywhere.” Id. at 142.  
n35. The evocation of television resonates with Carbone’s use of television characters as archetypes. 
Postmodernism is on familiar, if not familial, terms with popular culture. See, e.g., The Family Test Tube, Newsweek, 
May 28, 2001, at 50 (“Television has always been ahead of the curve when it comes to depicting unconventional 
households.”). Some high points include: Julia (1968), The Courtship of Eddie’s Father (1969), Partridge Family 
(1970), and Once and Again (1999). See id.; see also Elizabeth Wilson, These New Components of the Spectacle: 
Fashion and Postmodernism, in Postmodernism and Society 209 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990); cf. James 
Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 Ind. L.J. 875, 882 (2000) (attributing “the large proportion of references in 
[his] Article to popular journals and to sources on the internet” to “Karl Llewellyn’s dictum that ‘divorce is the major 
area of interaction between the social institution and the legal’“). Not only divorce, but family law more broadly, is 
usefully viewed as such a “major area of interaction,” and for this reason particularly susceptible to pomo influence and 
appropriation. As Carbone notes, the question of an unmarried father’s parental role was addressed by the Supreme 
Court in a “trio of cases [in the 1980s] (although it would not be until the 1990s that the issue became the popular 
subject of tabloids and made-for-TV movies).” Carbone, supra note 3, at 166. But see Pierre Schlag, Foreword: 
Postmodernism and Law, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 439, 444 (1991) (explaining how all law is already postmodern). See also 
J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1966, 1973 (1992) (asserting that 
“jurisprudence produced during the postmodern era will turn out to display elements of postmodernity whether this is 
consciously desired or not”).  
n36. Karen Springen & Pat Wingert, Is It Healthy for the Kids? Newsweek, May 28, 2001, at 54 (“Until recently, 
the disfunctionality of nontraditional families was a self-fulfilling assumption; children without a biological mother and 
father were stigmatized and shunned. Now, in all but the most conservative milieus, that is no longer true.”). Compare 
Melissa Fay Greene, The Family Mobile, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2001, at 32 (describing “large families,” or families 
with more than six children, focusing on families with seventeen and eighteen children, including adopted and often 
physically handicapped children), with Lisa Belkin, Your Kids Are Their Problem, N.Y. Times Mag., July 23, 2000, at 
30 (describing emergence of a new “child free” movement), and Patricia Lunneborg, The Chosen Lives of Childfree 
Men (1999) (describing men’s experience of childlessness and noting how it differs from women’s).  
n37. Nicholas Kulish, Census 2000: The New Demographics, Wall. St. J., May 15, 2001, at B1. The 2000 census 
confirmed that “fewer than 24% of homes were composed of husband, wife and children under age 18.” If the 
traditional family is limited to stay-at-home mothers and sole breadwinner fathers, this falls to fewer than ten percent. 
Dowd, supra note 7, at 2. But see Janny Scott, A Nation by the Numbers, Smudged, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2001, at 20 
(“The farther the numbers migrate from the bureau’s offices, the less anyone lets on that the census is no more than 
what one former bureau director calls it: an estimate of the truth.”). See generally Theodore M. Porter, Trust in 
Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (1995).  
n38. See Coontz, supra note 5.  
n39. “In short, generalizations are suspect; emphasis on the particular and recognition of differences across time, 
race, and class are the hallmarks of rigor in modern historical scholarship.” Carbone, supra note 3, at 57.  
n40. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 15, 18 (1992) (“For 
most of this century, the dominant model of motherhood has meant something closer to ‘housewife’ - a married, 
nonworking, inherently selfless, largely nonsexual, white woman with children.”); see generally Adrienne Rich, Of 
Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (10th ed. 1986) (examining, in feminist terms, motherhood in 
a social context and as part of a political institution). For a collection of essays exploring “representations of 
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motherhood [which] are not essentialized, romanticized, or idealized,” see Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the 
Legal Regulation of Motherhood (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995).  
n41. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 Or. L. Rev. 649, 
662-67 (1984) (discussing historical trends which produced no-fault). For critiques of no-fault, see Martha Albertson 
Fineman, The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform 32-33 (1991) (describing the impact of 
no-fault divorce on women). For a description of the “counterrevolutionary legal proposals” that have sprung up in 
response to no-fault divorce, see DiFonzo, supra note 35, at 881, and Laura Bradford, Note, The Counter Revolution: A 
Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 607 (1997).  
n42. Carbone relies on a Doonesbury strip to depict the phenomenon. Carbone, supra note 3, at 7-8 (describing a 
short, balding, middle-aged but wealthy executive dumping his wife for a “stunningly attractive young professional”). 
Carbone’s preference for cartoonist Gary Trudeau over Nobel Prize-winning economist Gary Becker reflects a very 
pomo preference for low culture over “high,” and for petit narrative over “grand theory.”  
n43. Carbone, supra note 3, at 9. Carbone’s rigorous endnotes leave no ambiguity here. Id. at 251 (citing four recent 
studies). Women do not file more often because men gallantly allow them to, for example.  
n44. Carbone, supra note 3, at 17.  
n45. Id. at 17-18. Black women have always worked outside the home. Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why 
Family and Work Conflict and What To Do About It 165 (2000) (noting that “black women worked outside the home in 
much higher proportion than did white women until very recently”); see generally Making a Living Doing Domestic 
Work, in Black Women in White America 227, 227-39 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1992).  
n46. See Editorial, Mom the Provider, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1995, at E14 (citing a Louis Harris & Associates poll 
showing that women “share equally with their husbands in supporting their families”); Sue Shellenbarger, Women 
Indicate Satisfaction with Role of Big Breadwinner, Wall St. J., May 11, 1995, at B1 (citing a study by the Families and 
Work Institute showing that “55% of employed women bring in half or more of their household income”).  
n47. Carbone, supra note 3, at 19.  
n48. The limitations of abstract metanarratives in general (and those positing humans as ‘rational actors’ in 
particular) is a recurring theme in postmodernism. See John Gray, The Best-Laid Plans, N.Y. Times Bk. Rev., Apr. 19, 
1998, at 36 (“But scientific knowledge is too abstract to capture our understanding of local circumstances- the practical 
knowledge the ancient Greeks called metis, which carried Odysseus through his adventures.”).  
n49. Carbone, supra note 3, at 19.  
n50. Dowd, supra note 7, at 83 (“When men parent to the extent typical of women, their parenting is remarkably 
similar to mothering. It is not distinctively ‘male.’ When men nurture children, they do so just as well as women, even if 
as a group they do less.”). “One of the most striking trends to emerge from recent census data [is that] the number of ... 
single fathers with primary custody of their children has risen about 50% from 1990 to 2000.” Goldberg, supra note 23, 
at 1; see generally Armin A. Brott, The Single Father: A Dad’s Guide to Parenting Without a Partner (2000); Warren 
Farrell, Father and Child Reunion: How to Bring the Dads We Need to the Children We Love (2001); Responsible 
Single Fathers, at http://www.singlefather.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).  
n51. Dowd, supra note 7, at 2. The membership and substantive agenda of the “fathers’ rights movement” is an 
open question. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 48 (estimating the movement’s membership at somewhere between five 
thousand and ten thousand).  
n52. Dowd, supra note 7, at 60; see also Review & Outlook: The Dad Deficit, Wall St. J., June 15, 2001, at W19 
(noting with approval that George W. Bush announced federal aid for local pro-fatherhood efforts at the Fourth National 
Summit on Fatherhood and concluding that “the crucial measure [between the haves and have-nots in this country] is 
not whether families have money in the bank but whether they have a dad in the home”).  
n53. Dowd, supra note 7, at 60. But see, e.g., Carbone, supra note 3, at 117 (“More recent studies find that 
enhanced paternal involvement correlates with increased cognitive competence (and higher grades), greater empathy, 
less sex-stereotyped beliefs, and a more internal locus of control (not to mention greater teacher appreciation of field 
trip participation).”).  
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n54. Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence, 1 Berkeley Women’s 
L.J. 64 (1985) (urging feminists “to question everything”).  
n55. Gay fathers “might offer insights into what male parenting might be like outside conventional gender groups.” 
Dowd, supra note 7, at 78. But see Brendan Farrington, Judge Rules Florida Can Ban Gays from Adopting, Knoxville 
News-Sentinel, Aug. 31, 2001, at A1 (discussing federal judge’s upholding of Florida’s law banning homosexuals from 
adopting). See generally Am. Psychological Ass’n, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Resource for Psychologists 8 (1995) 
(reviewing forty-three empirical studies as well as other articles and concluding that “not a single study has found 
children of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to children of heterosexual 
parents”) (cited in David L. Chambers & Nancy D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the 
Twentieth Century, 33 Fam. L.Q. 523, 539 & n.50 (1999)).  
n56. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1690-91 (1998) (offering 
“a new account of hostile work environment harassment that emphasizes its role in reproducing work and work 
competence along masculine and feminine lines”). For an analysis of the difficulties faced by American fathers taking 
family leave, see Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1047 (1994). See also Michael Selmi, 
Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 707 (2000) (suggesting a contract set-aside program to 
reward employers for establishing leave policies that succeed in getting men to take more parental leave); Williams, 
supra note 45 (proposing a broad range of strategies to address gendered divisions of market and family work). Dowd 
herself has contributed to this work. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the 
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 79 (1989).  
n57. Dowd, supra note 7, passim. There are more than two million single fathers in the U.S., comprising at least 
one-sixth of the country’s single parents, up from one-ninth in 1970. Goldberg, supra note 23, at 1; see also Nancy 
Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1037, 1075 (1996); 
Barbara Stark, Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce Practice, Feminist Theory, and Family Law 
Doctrine, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 293 (1997).  
n58. Dowd, supra note 7, passim; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: 
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2154 (1994); see generally Francine M. Deutsch & 
Susan E. Saxon, The Double Standard of Praise and Criticism for Mothers and Fathers, Psychol. Women Q., Dec. 1, 
1998, at 665 (1998).  
n59. Articles about these men appeared everywhere on Father’s Day. See, e.g., Joe Dziemianowicz, Solo, With 
Children, N.Y. Daily News, June 17, 2001, at 2 (noting that “the number of fathers raising children on their own is up a 
whopping sixty-two percent [since 1990]”); Adam Stern, Single Dad: Popular But Misunderstood, N.Y. Times, June 17, 
2001, at sect. 9, p. 1 (noting that “our [single fathers] ranks may be growing ... but we are still a curious and 
misunderstood minority”); Warren Farrell, Time for a Father and Child Reunion, WorldNetDaily, June 16, 2001, at 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE ID=23280 (last visited Jan. 25, 2002) (noting that the 
percentage of single fathers has almost doubled, from ten percent to nineteen percent of all single-parent households in 
the past twenty years).  
n60. In a recent study, for example, Peg Brinig confirms that divorced fathers suffer from severe depression when 
they lack contact with their children. Margaret Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce 
and the Division of Labor, in Marriage and Divorce: An Economic Perspective (Duos & Rowthern eds., forthcoming 
2002).  
n61. Such support has probably been most fully realized in Sweden, where all parents of newborn children are 
entitled to stay home full time for a total of 450 days. To encourage parents to take time off, one month has been 
reserved exclusively for fathers and one for mothers. New Life: A Gender Equality Magazine for New Parents 12 
(2001), available at http://naring.regeringen.se/fragor/jam-stalldret/sonja2001/pdf/Parental benefit.pdf. In 1993-94, 
before [Dad’s month] was introduced, more than half of all father’s (!) had taken no paternity leave 
whatsoever before the child turned four. Today with Dad’s month in place, over 80 percent of all 
fathers take some form of paternity leave. Almost half of all men have taken their full Dad’s month. 
Id. at 15. Dowd did some of her earliest work on this topic in Sweden. See Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and 
Family: A Critical Perspective on International Models, 26 Harv. J. on Legis. 311 (1989).  
n62. As Rena Uviller observed over twenty years ago, “unless the daily concerns of child rearing become the 
shared responsibility of both father and mother, there is little chance that women with children will achieve equality 
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outside the home.” Rena K. Uviller, Fathers’ Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 Harv. 
Women’s L.J. 107, 109 (1978).  
n63. See supra note 56.  
n64. Because women’s identities as mothers and primary caretakers are so much 
stronger than men’s identities as fathers and primary caretakers, the 
gender division of labor will continue. Not only must men change, but so 
must women - they must still continue to identify themselves as parents, 
but they must also share fully in that status with men. 
Cahn, supra note 10, at 214. Joan Williams makes a similar point. Williams, supra note 45, passim. For articles on the 
“new fatherhood,” see Jerry Adler, Building a Better Dad, Are You a Better Father Than Your Father? Newsweek, June 
17, 1996, at 58 (discussing whether better, more caring, sensitive fathers are what children really need); and Nancy R. 
Gibbs, Bringing Up Father, Time, June 28, 1993, at 54 (“America finds its stereotypes [about fathers] crushed in the 
collision between private needs and public pressures.”).  
n65. The risks are considerable. As Cahn notes, “It may not be safe for women to relinquish this power, not only 
because men will not perform homework, but because relinquishment will have detrimental impacts. When it comes to 
child custody, for example, working women are penalized for leaving home by losing custody to working men.” Cahn, 
supra note 10, at 222.  
n66. Over half of Dowd’s thirty-six-page bibliography consists of works by social scientists. Dowd, supra note 7, at 
248-74.  
n67. Carbone, supra note 3, at 55-66. For a history of custody law, see Mary Ann Mason, From Father’s Property to 
Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the United States (1994). For a history of fatherhood, see Robert L. 
Griswold, Fatherhood in America: A History (1993). For histories of black families, see Peggy Cooper Davis, 
Neglected Stories: The Constitution and Family Values (1997); E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United 
States (1939); and The Black Family: Essays and Studies (Robert Staples ed., 4th ed. 1991). Both authors are self-
professed feminists and well-versed in anti-essentialism; i.e., the notion that the category of “women” necessarily 
includes women of diverse races, classes and other overlapping groups. See June M. Carbone, Economics, Feminism, 
and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1463 (1990); Dowd, supra note 7, at 14-15; 
see also Ellizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988); Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination 
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism 
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990); see also Dowd, supra note 7, at 129 (extending Dorothy 
Roberts’ analysis of race to sexual orientation).  
n68. Carbone, supra note 3, at 67-84; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 
871 (1994). Family research has overwhelmingly focused on white families until fairly recently. See Paul R. Amato, 
Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents’ Divorce, 4 Future Child. 143, 148 (1994).  
n69. Carbone, supra note 3, at 67-84; see also Donna L. Franklin, Ensuring Inequality: The Structural 
Transformation of the African-American Family (1997).  
n70. See Carbone, infra notes 153-54. As a corollary, analyses based on African-American experience may have 
significance for the broader community. Because “delayed childbearing correlates directly with socioeconomic status” 
and “the negative consequences of single parenthood ... are borne most heavily by the children whose families have the 
least income[,] Donna Franklin’s thesis that these changes in family practices ‘ensure inequality’ applies not just to 
African-Americans but to the society at large.” Carbone, supra note 3, at 126.  
n71. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1993).  
n72. “Neither [the] Hispanic culture nor the identifiable Hispanic subgroups are culturally monolithic. Hispanic 
culture is affected by immigration ... .” Dowd, supra note 7, at 74; see also id. at 65-75 (summarizing the literature on 
fathers of color); see generally Sandra T. Azar & Corina L. Benjet, A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and 
Termination of Parental Rights, 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 249, 265 (1994) (urging that custody evaluations “be grounded 
in a well-articulated theory of parenting competency” taking into account “the racial and ethnic diversity in our 
society”).  
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n73. Dowd, supra note 7, at 132-49. Family law itself has been criticized for effectively excluding the poor. 
Jacobus tenBroek famously described the “dual system of family law” in a three-part article. Jacobus tenBroek, 
California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origins, Development, and Present Status, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (1964) 
(Part 1), 16 Stan. L. Rev. 900 (1964) (Part 2), 17 Stan. L. Rev. 614 (1965) (Part 3).  
n74. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down city ordinance restricting 
dwelling units to “single family” and recognizing “only a few categories of related individuals” as a family).  
n75. As Cahn observes in her review of Single Parent Families, “[Dowd] wants to support all families, regardless of 
their form.” Cahn, supra note 15, at 236.  
n76. See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 3, at 154 (describing the suit against Frank Serpico, the former New York City 
police officer who exposed corruption in the department, and was sued for child support by a woman who told him that 
she was using birth control).  
n77. As she breezily points out, for example: 
Were Fineman to illustrate her work ... she might select ... the star of Grace Under Fire. Grace, a more 
recent addition to the world of TV sitcoms, is the divorced mother of three. Jimmy, her abusive, 
alcoholic ex-husband, who deserted the family, has come back into the picture... . His presence is a 
mixed blessing. 
Id. at 27. Earlier she has used families from well-known sitcoms (the Nelsons (The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet), 
the Reeds (The Donna Reed Show), the Ricardos (I Love Lucy)) to breathe life into “the sexual division of labor Becker 
and Okin describe with successful breadwinners, full-time homemakers, tensions that build to successful resolution, and 
only occasional yearning for something more.” Id. at 16; see also Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, Unmarried, With 
Children, Newsweek, May 28, 2001, at 46 (introducing a report on pomo parenting by stating: “just imagine what 
would happen if June and Ward Cleaver were negotiating family life these days”).  
n78. See Griswold, supra note 67, at 224-25 (most American corporations “look askance” at paternal leave); see 
also Dowd, supra note 7, at 56 (citing research showing workplace costs for involved fathers); Joann S. Lubin, Working 
Dads Find Family Involvements Can Help Out Careers, Wall St. J., May 30, 2000, at B1 (providing anecdotes about 
fathers being explicit about their needs for flexible schedules because of their children); Joann S. Lublin, Yea to That 
‘90s Dad, Devoted to the Kids ... But He’s Out Again?, Wall St. J., June 13, 1995, at A1.  
n79. See supra note 66.  
n80. Dowd, supra note 7, passim.  
n81. See Ihab Hassen, The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture 89 (1987) (“despite 
[postmodernism’s] fanatic will to unmaking, it also contains the need to discover a ‘unitary sensibility’“).  
n82. Barbara Stark, Bottom Line Feminist Theory: The Dream of a Common Language, 23 Harv. Women’s L.J. 
227, 228 n.8 (2000).  
n83. Alan Stone, Questions and Comments, in Human Rights at Harvard 55, 59 (1997). While some postmodernists 
relentlessly challenge normativity, see Schlag, supra note 35, others concede that the process of questioning, trashing, 
deconstructing, “always must stop.” J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 1613, 1627 (1990). This is not, of course, closure. Rather, as Roy Boyne and Ali Rattansi observe, “There is ... a 
postmodernism of ‘resistance’ as well as a postmodernism of ‘reaction.’“ Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, Introduction, in 
Postmodernism and Society, supra note 35, at 29.  
n84. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581, 586 (1990).  
n85. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 849 (1990).  
n86. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr. & Ann Laquer Estin, Domestic Relations 621-22 (6th ed. 2000) (citing Marisol 
A. v. Guiliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (problems with foster care in New York); see also Eggers, supra note 1 
and accompanying text. Unlike Eggers, however, as a family law teacher Dowd knows that children removed from their 
homes may not be placed in better ones. See Nina Bernstein, The Lost Children of Wilder: The Epic Struggle to Change 
Foster Care (2001) (describing the twenty-six year history of the case against the New York City foster care system and 
the tragic outcomes for the children involved). But see Dowd, supra note 7, at 95 (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster 
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Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), for the proposition that foster families, like biological families, 
are entitled to constitutional deference).  
n87. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (striking state statute requiring children to 
attend public school noting that “the child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations”); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that state cannot prevent parents from having their children learn a foreign 
language); see generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as 
Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992) (criticizing cases for neglecting children’s perspectives).  
n88. “A system of commitment to a basic level of economic resources is the most preferable, which would require a 
combination of public and private resources.” Dowd, supra note 7, at 223.  
n89. Ihab Hassan offers a schematic set of dichotomies, which suggests, for example, that postmodernism is to 
rhetoric as modernism is to semantics. Hassan, supra note 81, at 89.  
n90. Dowd, supra note 7, at 233.  
n91. Carbone, supra note 3, at 123. As Elizabeth Scott points out, “norms, or ‘customary law,’ regulate family 
relations more effectively than do formal legal enactments because norms structure conduct into roles and functions that 
create stable expectations.” Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 615, 
669 (1992); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning Parenthood 
in Irrational Action, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2493, 2494 (1995) (stressing “the effects of legal rhetoric in shaping extralegal 
cultural norms”). Katharine Silbaugh has criticized Carbone for her apparent “inconsistency” on the impact of reform 
efforts. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 Geo. L.J. 923 (2000) (book review); see also Bix, 
supra note 14. That such efforts might be productive in some contexts and futile in others seems unremarkable. Carbone 
recognizes the limits of such efforts now, given our “postmodern condition,” which is an important insight.  
n92. As she observes, citing Justice Stevens in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), even the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that the “intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety.” Carbone, supra note 3, 
at 167.  
n93. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change 44 (1989).  
n94. “She and I are collaborating peacefully, tag-teaming, doing the parent-teacher conferences together. We are a 
circus family, a trapeze family, with perfect timing, great showmanship, tight green outfits.” Eggers, supra note 1, at 
301.  
n95. Id. at 82.  
n96. See Marygold S. Melli et al., Child Custody in a Changing World: A Study of Postdivorce Arrangements in 
Wisconsin, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 773 (empirical study of changing child custody arrangements); see also Margaret F. 
Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 Ind. L.J. 393 (1998) (examining 
underlying theories of joint custody); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Children’s Preference in Adjudicated Custody Decisions, 
22 Ga. L. Rev. 1035 (1988) (reporting empirical study finding social norm supporting participation by adolescents in 
custody determinations); Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s Perspective, 32 Fam. L.Q. 201 
(1998) (arguing that joint custody agreements should be carefully scrutinized).  
n97. As Carbone notes, for example, “In the 1990s, this [more egalitarian] partnership ideal is under assault just as 
it is achieving its fullest realization.” Carbone, supra note 3, at 147.  
n98. See, e.g., id. at 115 (“Kristin Luker, in her account of the politics of teenage pregnancy, questions whether any 
study can effectively control for all the differences that separate single parents from parents in other families.”).  
n99. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (terminating parental rights of biological father when he failed to 
avail himself of any of the several legal alternatives provided by state law through which he could assert paternity).  
n100. [E]conomic parenthood ... [fails because the legal system cannot 
ensure] that economic obligations are honored. Biological models 
have failed because we continue to fail to establish paternity for a 
significant number of children. Economic models have failed because 
we fail to ensure payment of obligations ... [and] fail to provide 
adequate backup economic support when ... the obligation cannot be 
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paid, and fail to insure adequate, universal support (private or 
public) for all children. Marriage models are insufficient because 
so many children are born outside marriage and so many marriages 
fail. 
Dowd, supra note 7, at 161; see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (terminating parental rights of biological 
father who had visited his son, although neither provided regular support nor legitimated him); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W. 2d 588 (1992) (holding that divorcing husband could veto use of frozen embryos fertilized with his sperm).  
n101. Dowd, supra note 7, at 161.  
n102. Id. at 8; see generally Kathleen Gerson, No Man’s Land: Men’s Changing Commitments to Family and Work 
215-55 (1993) (describing “dilemmas of involved fatherhood”).  
n103. “The post divorce pattern of fathers’ relationships with their children is bleak and disheartening for both 
fathers and children.” Dowd, supra note 7, at 59.  
n104. Id. at 28. “Step parenting ... is an extremely common form of fatherhood in America. The data on step-
families indicate that these families do not do well, and that we lack a good understanding of their dynamics or a heathy 
vision of how they should function.” Id. at 85; see also Springen & Wingert, supra note 36, at 55 (noting that a 
spokeswoman from the University of Chicago “says that more than half the serious brain injuries her hospital sees in 
infants are inflicted by ‘paramour perpetrators’ - men who lack the biological and emotional connection that inhibits 
parents from hurting their own children”).  
n105. Dowd, supra note 7, at 179-80.  
n106. Id. at 77. Dowd cites Katharine Bartlett’s argument “for legal support of multiple parental figures, especially 
by a liberal use of visitation statutes” as well as Barbara Bennett Woodhouse’s “kinships of responsibility” and Naomi 
Cahn’s suggestion that “when multiple adults come forward as caretakers, we might want to consider them all rather 
than reducing them to two.” Id. at 140-41. But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding state 
statute precluding alleged biological father’s claim to paternity of child born within extant marriage).  
n107. Dowd, supra note 7, at 180.  
n108. These include: (1) nurturing fathers who parent their children as mothers do, (2) nurturing fathers in step-
families, blended families or cohabiting families, (3) “less engaged fathers who are backup or minimal nurturers plus 
breadwinners,” id. at 82, (4) “disengaged fathers, some of whom play an economic role,” id., and (5) “fathers who have 
never engaged with their children and have no connection of any sort with them.” Id.; see also Deutsch & Saxon, supra 
note 58 (describing gendered perceptions of parenting); Sean Elder, Dabbling Dads, N.Y. Times Mag., June 11, 1995, at 
30 (describing “Gentlemen Fathers” who parent on weekends, unlike the author, a primary caretaker father); see 
generally Dowd, supra note 7, at 62 (“the nurturing [fathers] who are [in fact] poorly supported by the legal structure, 
and often socially viewed as unmanly by their peers”); authorities cited supra note 59.  
n109. Dowd, supra note 7, at 58-65.  
n110. Id. at 75-80; see also Louis Bayard, Two Men and a Baby, Wash. Post, June 17, 2001, at W14 (reporting gay 
couple’s adoption of a six-month-old Vietnamese boy).  
n111. Dowd, supra note 7, at 65-75 (explaining how “the discourse of inferiority masks the realities of economic 
disempowerment that not only make it difficult to fulfill traditional breadwinner father roles, but also prevent that role 
from being recast in a more nurturing direction”).  
n112. Id. at 179.  
n113. Id. at 58. As she notes, for example, “Overall, white children have more contact with their fathers but among 
nonresident fathers, Black fathers have high levels of visitation... . Black fathers, especially middle-class ones, remain 
involved with their families to a greater degree than white fathers.” Id. at 70.  
n114. Id. at 161-62. 
[V]irtually all scholars emphasize how little we know, and therefore how provisional any data must 
be. We have neither the demographic data nor the tested correlations for fathers that we have for 
mothers. This factor alone is enormously indicative of our assumptions about fathers. Even more 
important, it demands that any definition of policy with respect to fathers be provisional. 
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Id. at 81.  
n115. Carbone, supra note 3, at 51.  
n116. See, e.g., supra note 42 (describing Carbone’s use of Doonesbury; supra note 77 (describing sitcom families).  
n117. Murphy Brown is a television journalist played by Candice Bergen, who crossed over into real politics when 
Vice President Dan Quayle famously criticized her decision to become a single mother. Barbara Vobejda, Can a Sitcom 
Change Society?, Wash. Post, May 21, 1992, at A1 (describing the “zany and almost surreal reaction: from radio talk 
shows to the White House” in response to Quayle’s comment that the character was “mocking the importance of fathers 
by bearing a child alone”); see also Dan Quayle, Why I Think I’m Still Right, Newsweek, May 28, 2001, at 52 
(explaining that his “concern has always been for the welfare of the child”).  
n118. Carbone, supra note 3, at 51-52. Recognizing that “American society may not be able to reach a consensus on 
‘family values,’“ for example, Carbone identifies a partial, contingent consensus (“the middle class has embraced a new 
strategy for success”), including gender equality with respect to investment in earning capacity, education, sexual 
activity, and contribution to the relationship, coupled with the contingency of marriage. Id. at 125.  
n119. Carbone, supra note 3, at 240; see also Jane W. Ellis, Surveying the Terrain: A Review Essay of Divorce 
Reform at the Crossroads, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 471, 476 (1992) (book review) (arguing that mothers are especially 
vulnerable because they often put their relationships with their children above all other considerations). For a promising 
approach to this problem, see Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493, 527 (1995) (arguing that 
settlement agreements should be submitted in distinct stages so that custody and visitation arrangements would have to 
be approved prior to any financial agreement). In 1993, a number of states had enacted “friendly parent” statutes which 
penalize parents who fail to facilitate the other parent’s contact with the child. Developments in the Law: Legal 
Responses to Domestic Violence, Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1597, 1601 
(1993). For a critical assessment of such statutes, see Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 
Ohio St. L.J. 455, 476 (1984).  
n120. Carbone, supra note 3, at 240. For a discussion of the ways in which courts subject men as well as women to 
gender bias in custody cases, see Levit, supra note 57, at 1075.  
n121. Custody is now generally determined by the “best interest of the child” standard. See, e.g., Unif. Marriage 
and Divorce Act 402 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 156 (1987) (including among factors to be considered in determining 
the “best interest of the child,” parents’ wishes, child’s wishes, child’s relationships with parents and others, child 
adjustment to home, school, and community, and mental and physical health of all involved); Beth K. Clark, Acting in 
the Best Interest of the Child: Essential Components of a Child Custody Evaluation, 29 Fam. L.Q. 19 (1995) (describing 
how psychologists involved in custody disputes can apply this standard). But see Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the 
Best Interests of the Child (1973) (concluding that it is better for the child to be placed with the “psychological parent,” 
that is, the adult with whom the child is most strongly bonded). For a summary of the scholarship refuting men’s claims 
that the best interest standard is a pretext for maternal bias, see Terry Arendell, Fathers and Divorce 77-83 (1995).  
n122. Carbone, supra note 3, at 240; see also Melli et al., supra note 96, at 800. Carbone synthesizes the Supreme 
Court cases on paternal rights as well as the commentary of leading scholars and several state supreme court justices to 
identify three extant models of fatherhood: (1) biological fathers, who receive legal recognition absent abandonment or 
forfeit; (2) “fathering” determined by bonding or nurturing; and (3) fathering conceived as a role fundamentally 
different from (and complementary to) mothering. Carbone, supra note 3, at 164. She proposes the following bottom 
line: a father should (1) not endanger the baby’s well-being during pregnancy, (2) assure that the baby is cared for, and 
(3) above all, make a permanent commitment to the child. Id. at 178-79; see also In re Raquel Marie X., 173 A.D.2d 709 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a three-year-old child could remain with her adoptive parents where biological 
father did not establish paternity until after the adoption, contributed minimally to expenses during pregnancy and did 
not help care for newborn); see generally Deborah Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in 
Context, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 967 (1994).  
n123. Carbone, supra note 3, at 241.  
n124. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991).  
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n125. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1921 (1987) (arguing that 
certain core aspects of personhood should similarly be inalienable); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and 
Women’s Household Labor, 9 Yale J.L. & Feminism 81 (1997).  
n126. See Memorandum from Martha Ertman to Barbara Stark, Call for Papers/Commodification Futures: 
Retheorizing Commodification (July 2000) (on file with author); see also Norman K. Denzin, Postmodernism and 
Deconstructionism, in Postmodernism and Social Inquiry 182, 184 (David Dickins & Andrea Fontanades eds., 1994) 
(linking postmodernism to the commodification of sexuality and desire).  
n127. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 7, at 133 (“By making a father’s absence a negative to be avoided, and his 
presence as critical to all members of the family - and simultaneously defining presence in economic terms as based on 
wage work - fathers came to be almost exclusively defined in economic terms.”).  
n128. Carbone, supra note 3, at 51 (describing the delegation of caregiving work to underpaid nannies); see 
generally Emma Rothschild, Who’s Going to Pay for All This?, N.Y. Times, July 1, 2001, at 10 (describing economist’s 
analysis of the costs of caregiving).  
n129. Nancy Folbre, The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values 50 (2001) (arguing that nurturing is 
undervalued, in part, because no effort is made to impute a value to “happy, healthy, and successful children”).  
n130. See Carbone, supra note 3, at 252 n.6; Dowd, supra note 7, at 53-54. For Eggers, twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week, childcare is costing him his youth, not to mention his sex life (he does, of course, mention it). See, 
e.g., Eggers, supra note 1, passim. At the same time, his deep ambivalence about hiring a sitter makes it impossible for 
him to enjoy the few hours of free time he purchases. Id.  
n131. For a survey of the wide-ranging estimates, see Thomas J. Espenshade, Investing in Children: New Estimates 
of Parental Expenditures (1984). In addition to time spent, there may be lost opportunity costs, such as high-paying jobs 
turned down because of inflexible hours or required travel. See generally Jean L. Potuchek, Who Supports the Family? 
Gender and Breadwinning in Dual-Earner Marriages (1997) (arguing that “breadwinning” is socially constructed and 
negotiated and also affected by mothering).  
n132. Arlie Hochschild & Ann MacHung, The Second Shift 8-10 (1989); see also Paul Starr, Women’s Work, N.Y. 
Times Book Rev., Feb. 11, 2001, at 9 (“Despite all the customary praise of mothers, the devaluation of their work is 
deeply entrenched in our thought and institutions.”).  
n133. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that illegitimate children have as much right to child support 
as legitimate children).  
n134. See, e.g., Bartholet, supra note 20, at 59 (arguing that “huge numbers of children are growing up in this 
country without what all children need - true parenting”). “If you follow the logic of the market, you end up with a 
childless society.” Kristina Hultman, A Step Away from a Childless Society?, in New Life: A Gender Equality 
Magazine for New Parents 11 (2001), available at 
http://naring.regeringen.se/fragor/jamstalldret/Sonja2001/pdf/Parenthood.pdf (describing the work of sociologist 
Gunnar Andersson, whose research focuses on the relationship between work and family life in the Nordic countries).  
n135.  
Our policies assert that it should be less comfortable to be on welfare than to work, which is sensible. 
They also assert that a mother who cannot feed and house her child should not raise them, which also 
is sensible. The consequences are not. Lamont’s care cost the city half a million dollars, far more than 
it would have cost to support his mother, and it repeatedly and traumatically severed him from an 
enduring human relationship, as crucial to a child’s development as food and heat. 
Tanya Luhrmann, A Perfect Test Case, N.Y. Times Book Rev., Mar. 25, 2001, at 8; see also Lynn A. Stout, Some 
Thoughts on Poverty and Failure in the Market for Children’s Human Capital, 81 Geo. L.J. 1945 (1993).  
n136. See Porter, supra note 37 (explaining why numbers used in public policy debates are problematic).  
n137. According to the Census Bureau, thirty-eight percent of single fathers receive child support compared to sixty 
percent of single mothers. The average amount received by both as of 1997 was $ 3,300 per year. Goldberg, supra note 
23, at 14.  
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n138. As Carbone puts it, while “child support rests ... on natural love and affection, and societal insistence that 
parents assume responsibility for the children they bring into the world ... these sentiments, ... though almost universally 
shared, do not dictate particular dollar amounts.” Carbone, supra note 3, at 155.  
n139. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6 
Harv. Women’s L.J. 1 (1983). The ongoing debates can be traced in the series of federal acts addressing the topic. See, 
e.g., Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring state to establish child support programs); Child Support Enforcement 
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 
U.S.C.). Dowd characterizes the “massive effort to increase child support” as “disappointing and hardly cost-effective.” 
Dowd, supra note 7, at 148.  
n140. See generally Laura W. Morgan, Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation and Application (1996 & Supps. 
1997-99).  
n141. Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 [hereinafter PRWORA]. For a cogent summary of earlier efforts, see Paul K. 
Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 Fam. L.Q. 519 
(1996).  
n142. Mothers are the custodial parents in the vast majority of cases. Stark, supra note 57, at 307-08. Where fathers 
are the custodial parents, however, child support plummets. Dowd, supra note 7, at 143. The inadequacy of child 
support guidelines had been confirmed by Marsha Garrison in a scathing critique. Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or 
Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 41, 57-72 (1998).  
n143. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 418 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding child support award against 
singer Daryl Hall capped by guidelines because “it would be inappropriate to use a child support obligation to upgrade 
[mother’s] standard of living”).  
n144. The legal system’s objectives of increasing child support awards and payment for both marital and non-
marital children represent a “radical change in theory, and an even more radical change in reality, within the span of 
only a few decades.” Dowd, supra note 7, at 145.  
n145. Id. at 144. This is grounded in the history of child support and confirmed in its modern iteration: “Child 
support is commonly viewed as a proportionate share of parental income, not of children’s needs. Proportionality means 
that parental resources may be adequate for needs but are not tapped, while, in other cases, parental resources are not 
adequate but not so inadequate as to trigger state support.” Id.  
n146. Annamay T. Sheppard, Paying for Women’s Work: The Unfinished Business of American Family Law, in 
Comparative Perspectives: Gender Bias and Family Law 1 (Barbara Stark ed., 1992); see also Ann Crittenden, The 
Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the World Is Still the Least Valued (2001).  
n147. Carbone, supra note 3, at 162-63.  
n148. Dowd, supra note 7, at 153. “If you’re not involved emotionally, there’s no motivation to stay involved 
financially,” according to Robert Green, a member of the Texas Fathers Alliance which worked to amend the Texas 
Family Code to include a presumption of joint custody in 1995. Goldberg, supra note 20, at 52.  
n149. “Strong evidence demonstrates that even if the system were fully implemented and all support were paid, the 
support would be inadequate to meet the needs of children.” Dowd, supra note 7, at 222.  
n150. Even if the children do qualify for welfare, there are constitutional limits on methods to coerce payment. 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that fundamental right to marry cannot be conditioned on payment of 
past child support). But see Associated Press, Court Lets Stand Ban on More Kids Unless Man Pays Child Support, 
Milwaukie J. Sentinel, Nov. 24, 2001, at 2B (reporting Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision to uphold lower court 
decision sentencing David Oakley to prison for failure to pay child support stayed in favor of probation on the condition 
that Oakley not father any children unless he could prove to this court that he could support the new child in addition to 
his other nine).  
n151. “The poverty statistics for all children are alarmingly high, but for Black and Hispanic children the figures 
are catastrophic. More than 40 percent of all Black and Hispanic children are poor, compared to 16 percent of white 
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children.” Dowd, supra note 7, at 68. As Dowd notes critically, “the rate of child poverty shows little sign of abatement 
as sufficiency issues have been unaddressed while the focus has been on enforcement [of child support].” Dowd, supra 
note 7, at 146.  
n152. Id. (“The welfare system was never intended to benefit fathers. Fathers were presumed able to work and 
support their families under the breadwinner definition of fatherhood. The social welfare system for men was linked to 
work, to benefits that were seen as entitlements - unemployment, worker’s compensation, and disability payments.”). 
Citing Richard Collier, Dowd describes the court’s outrage where a father 
wanted to live on social security in order to care for his four-year-old child. The judge stated that it 
would be plainly wrong and silly if the father were to remain unemployed in order to look after one 4-
year-old boy ... I shall take a great deal of convincing that it is right that an adult male should be 
permanently unemployed in order to look after one small boy. 
Dowd, supra note 7, at 134.  
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